The Country Man and the Universal Moral Law

In Tuesday’s class, we had an insightful discussion about Immanuel Kant’s idea of the goodwill, reverence for the law, and the categorical imperative. As I pondered over these topics, I remembered the first passage we read this semester—Kafka’s “Before the Law”— and I identified some areas of connection between the two that I’ll like to put up for discussion.

The first categorical imperative states: “Act only in such a way that you can will the maxim of your actions as a universal law.” The issue of “torture” was brought up as we discussed this categorical imperative. We all agreed, by Kantian analysis, that torture is wrong because it violates a person’s autonomy. In other words, it inflicts enough pain to take away the victim’s ability to act on his/her will. Thus, the victim is forced to act on the torturer’s will. A somewhat similar scenario is seen in Kafka’s “Before the law.” Before I delve into the similarities, I’ll like to define “torture.” According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, torture is “anguish of the body or mind.” In other words, it is inflicting some kind of torment to the body or mind.

In “Before the Law,” the gatekeeper denies the country man admittance to the law. When the country man peeps through the gates, the gatekeeper laughs and says, “If it tempts you so much, try going inside in spite of my prohibition. But take note. I am powerful. And I am [the least] of gatekeepers. But from room to room stand gatekeepers, each more powerful than the other. I cannot endure even one glimpse of the third.” Now, I believe this statement was to intimidate the country man. First, the gate keeper instills some fear in the man, by stating “I am powerful.” He then informs the man that, although I am powerful, “You ain’t seen nothing yet. There are way more powerful gatekeepers after me.” This may well be considered a form of mental torture since the gatekeeper is somewhat inflicting anguish on the man’s mind.

By this analysis, we may agree that the gatekeeper’s actions were morally wrong. However, my main issue of contemplation is about the action of the country man. Although, he ended up subjecting his will to that of the gatekeeper, do his actions agree with the first categorical imperative: “Act only in such a way that you can will the maxim of your actions as a universal law?” Will every rational human being in his situation act as he did, i.e. succumb to the gatekeeper’s will?
I look forward to hearing your views on this matter.

The Usefulness of Utilitarianism When Compared With Deontology

After reading the first half of Mill’s Utilitarianism I found it to be in a number of respects a more realistic and practical ethical philosophy. To begin with, Mill addresses the varying circumstances of life, or what are often called the vicissitudes of fortune, to an extent that Kant does not. Mill writes that

Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise (9).

Thus, Mill acknowledges that appreciation of the “higher” forms of pleasure, and indeed of the precepts of any ethical theory, can be made quite difficult when one must struggle just to get by. This is not surprising considering that Mill admires Epicurus, who articulated something quite similar in his principle doctrines.

Kant, however, does not seem to fully recognize the difficulties that poverty, disease, and lack of education, for instance, present in the lives of those who are unlucky enough to experience them. It is true that Kant does write that one has a duty to secure one’s own happiness, “because discontent with one’s condition – bundled along by many cares and unmet needs – could easily become a great temptation to transgress against duties.” Nevertheless, Kant’s metaphysics of ethics does not obligate us to do what we can to raise each other up out of unfortunate social circumstances in the way that Utilitarianism does.

Furthermore, I find Kant’s theory to be unconvincing because it does not deal with actual consequences. Now, I know that according to Kant’s ethics we are not supposed to be concerned with consequences, but rather with motives. Still, even Kant is concerned with the results that our actions have on reason and on the theoretical “kingdom of ends.” For, Kant’s ethics prohibits us from taking actions that, if made a universal law, would result in contradiction. But how powerful is this consideration really? We all know that if and when we lie this will not suddenly bring about a universal law that makes it good to lie. In other words, no lie that we can tell will actually result in contradiction. Utilitarianism, however, does not deal with the theoretical consequences of our actions, but rather with the actual, practical results that our actions bring about. It seems to me that this is a far more useful way to approach ethics.

Right and Wrong Philosophy?

Human reason gives people the unique ability to control themselves to a unique degree and in different ways from irrational beings. Both Kant and Mill accept this idea—that this rationality is distinctly human and therefore plays some role in developing a basis of moral action for such human rational beings. Indeed, self-control is an intrinsic part of both philosophers’ conclusive ideas. But still, Kant’s deontological ideas of morality and Mill’s utilitarian ideas of morality are clear opposites. I was struck by this juxtaposition despite the importance of self-control, so I tried to identify where the ideas diverge in respect to what they expect from self-control.

Kant would say that exercising moral control would be the same as exercising humanity’s unique ability to create rules for itself that may oppose rules of instinct. So acting FOR THE SAKE OF DUTY, the ultimate way to act morally, takes extreme control of the mind: essentially one must CONTROL the will behind their actions.

Mills, on the other hand, would say that the moral way to use one’s self control is by meticulously calculating the utility of an action (that is, its consequential pleasure or pain). So the unique, higher sense of pleasure and pain of humans is monitored with careful control by the moral person.

Examining these differing ways of employing self-control, I can’t help but ask the question “Is each of these possible?” A person’s will to act, I believe, does not lie under the control of a person’s rationality. Habituation could, I think, make a person accustomed to acting in a certain moral way to the point that that person would not even have to think about the action, but that does not mean that the will itself is being controlled, just the way the will is obeyed or disobeyed. This then suggests that some other form of control, namely Mill’s idea of self-control, is employed when people act morally. When a person considers an action and judges it as moral or immoral, Kant argues that a moral person will consider the consequences and use his or her self-control to measure those consequences, not control his or her will. The fact, though, that Mill’s expectations seem possible while Kant’s expectations doesn’t necessarily mean utilitarianism is correct and deontology is not, does it? Isnt it a natural fallacy to say that an ethical philosophy is WRONG because it is an OUGHT (what SHOULD be possible) as opposed to an IS (what IS possible)? What does it mean if we cant claim that one theory is wrong and another right?

Recognizing Personhood: Merely a Means v. A Means to an End

Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative:

Act in such a way that you always treat humanity –
whether in your own person or that of another-
never merely as a means but always as an end-in- itself.

Our discussion of Kant’s idea of “mere means” in his second formulation of the Categorical Imperative has left me asking why there are some actions that treat others “merely as a means”.

Our example for the mere means versus means to an end distinction was shown by the waitress and whether we use her as a mere means or as a means to an end. When we ask the waitress of a margarita (using Dr. J’s example) we are using her as a means to an end but not as merely a means. This is so because we recognize her as a person but not as an object thus not merely as a means.

Let's apply this same idea to our class discussion of modern day slavery cases. I will preface that I am not, in any way, trying to justify our actions in relation to forced labor. So, when it comes to forced labor, we claimed in class that it is not moral for us to be buying Iphones just because we think that we need them even if we contribute to continuing the cycle for forced labor. We are using forced laborers merely as a means as opposed to means themselves.

Is the only reason that we do not use forced laborers as means and they are treated merely as means because we do not know the people or their personhood? We are able to see that we do not use the waitress as a mere means because we know her as a person and can identify her personhood. If we are able to recognizes another as a person, he or she is no longer an object, thus is not treated merely as a means. However, there are people who even after knowing a person still treat that person as a mere means ( as we said in the second part of the waitress example in class).

Thus, I am wondering how the recognition of personhood impacts the mere means versus the means to an end idea? Do you think that identifying a person and recognizing his or her personhood is the defining line between treating another as a mere means versus a means? Lastly, are there some actions that will always lead to treating another merely as a means versus a means to an end regardless of recognizes his or her personhood?

How I Came to Accept the Obvious Truth that Kant and Mill Are Not Interchangeable

Yesterday in class, when Dr. J asked if we’d all been converted to deontology, I honestly wasn’t quite sure. After studying Kant and Mill for the past two weeks, I’d stumbled rather aimlessly into the indecisive opinion that both of these philosophers offer fairly reasonable, although clearly demanding, paths to being a good person, to living the good life. Sure, they are direct opposites and view morality from totally different perspectives, with Kant judging moral actions solely from the side of motive and duty and Mill sticking just as consistently to judgments based on consequences, but the ideal outcomes of these systems both seem desirable. Kant’s world where people can put aside their own base desires for the sake of duty and where good will and rationality reigns sounds just as beautiful as Mill’s community of individuals working for the greatest happiness for all. To my inexperienced eyes, it seemed that which particular set of moral guidelines you chose to found your decisions on didn’t really matter. Instead, I saw the level of commitment to the guidelines, to reshaping your life and decisions around your chosen principles, as truly the determining factor. By my arbitrary calculations, a person who lived out Kantian principles most of the time would naturally be better than a person who followed Utilitarianism some of the time just as a fully committed Utilitarian would rank higher on this “goodness scale” than a part time Kantian. I thought it was the presence of the principles, not the content that made the difference.

My already weakly supported position was called further into question by this article from the Economist. http://www.economist.com/node/21530078

Apparently, in a study using a variation of the trolley problem we discuss so often in class, the people who chose to act based on utilitarian principles and actively kill one person to save five also tend to display psychopathic tendencies – not exactly the type of people we’d describe as living the good life. In this case at least, it seems to indicate that which values you ascribe to really does matter (an obvious conclusion, I know). If you continue to test utilitarianism with extreme applications of its principles, more and more questionable implications show up. For example, in a world of limited resources, killing off the youngest child of each family could result in greater happiness for the majority at the expense of the one, but could this ever be truly acceptable? In basic decisions these two systems often lead us to the same external actions. In extreme situations, however, nothing could be further from the truth. It is precisely these extreme situations, these moral dilemmas, where the guidance of these principles matters the most. My conclusion, after all this mess, is one against moral relativism. I’m still not sure which of the systems is “better,” but I have a feeling that one or the other is a better path to the good life. And that's one step closer, right?

Irregularities in Physical reason

In his discourse, Kant poses the question: “How is a priori knowledge possible?” His answer: Synthetic knowledge, or a priori knowledge, articulates situations on the prospect of experience. Thus, we know that they are binding not for the things they are themselves – but for the jurisdiction of presence.

Kant’s seminal philosophy receives an abundance of criticism from past and present day academics. The common thread of this criticism is acknowledgement of the abstractness of Kant’s viewpoint. As human beings, we live in a physical place at a point in time. It is not truly conceivable, much less appropriate, for us to isolate rationality from other features of our thinking. It seems to, therefore, be a mistake to assume that we can ignore our own character and particulates in favor of universal principles of reason.

Chapter 3 of the Groundwork for Metaphysics covers our unique ability to cause events through free will. Assuming that autonomy of the will and free will of the same, a will is free when and only when it follows moral doctrine. Thus, morality is understood as resulting from this perception of free will. In order to prove this, however, we need to establish that all rational beings have free will. Kant does this by supposing that rational beings consider themselves as free, and that our founding of the moral code [and the categorical imperative] comes from this understanding of freedom.

This is, to say it lightly, very circular logic. We think of ourselves as free because we are aware of our moral demands – but our concept of morality is based on freedom. How do you think Kant resolves this conflict, and is it logical?

The Consequences of Consequentialism

As our discussions this week have shown, there are many fundamental differences between Kant’s duty ethics and Mill’s Utilitarianism/consequentialism. However, I think we can all agree that one of the most important difference between the two is their respective view on the consequences of our actions. This may seem rather obvious, since the ethical theory Mill is writing about is in fact called consequentialism, but I think the focus on consequences is one to be highlighted and examined further.

For Kant’s duty ethics, we strive to achieve/produce the Good Will, which is intrinsically good. The Good Will is manifested in acting for the sake of duty alone, and is therefore is good without qualifications. According to Kant, the Good Will is still good even when the consequences its actions are not, meaning that goodness is not derivative of consequences. Therefore, the morality of actions enacted by the Good Will cannot be judged by the consequences of said action. This is a unique aspect of Kant’s argument that sets him apart and against many other philosophers: that there is no place for consequentialism in determining the morality of an action. For Kant, we can never know the full spectrum of potential consequences for an action because we are limited, and therefore can never know for certain what our actions will bring about. This has always been an aspect of Kantianism that has greatly interested me, and I agree with. This idea can be simplified to “it’s the thought that counts.” Kant is arguing that as long as the will and motivation behind an action are good, then the consequences cannot affect the morality of the action. However, when actions are committed for inclinations or self-interest, then they are not considered to be morally good.

Mill, on the other hand, completely bases his Greatest Happiness Principle, and therefore the Utilitarian Calculus, on the consequences of actions. The Greatest Happiness Principle states that things/actions that are good produce the most pleasure for the most amount of people, and bad things/actions produce the most pain. For Mill, we should always judge actions in light of their consequences rather than the goodness of the agent. I know it may seem simple, but I kept thinking about “it’s the thought that counts” whenever I disagreed with Mill (which, as someone with Kantian leanings, was pretty often). Personally, I think that by solely determining the morality of an action by its consequences cheapens the morality of said action. If an act is committed entirely of self-interest or to bring about a specific intended outcome, then is it really “Moral” or just good for that particular person in that particular situation? I know that Mill claims good actions (good in light of their consequences) help to bring about (in reality or theoretically) the best possible state of the world. However, I wonder just how the “best possible state of the world” could be achieved with everyone doing what they determine to be morally right by the consequences of their self-interest driven actions. I know that we take the potential consequences of our actions into account everyday, but I do not think it’s right to ascribe morality based on consequences rather than intention. Based on the discussion we had in class, I’m sure some of you will take issue with what I’ve said here, but I tend to agree with Kant on this one.