In class Thursday we discussed Kant's position that actions are not moral unless they proceed from a sense of duty. In this post I would like to analyze that position.
I want to discuss the same quote that Esha used in her blog post. Kant writes that "there are many souls so sympathetically attuned that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I assert that in such a case an action of this kind, however it may conform with duty and however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the same footing with other inclinations" (4:398).
I find this passage troubling. Think of Plato's Republic for the sake of comparison. Plato says that the individual who maintains an internal balance with reason as the ruler will inevitably do virtuous acts. This seems like a defensible position, and it has useful practical application—I can try to become a just person by fostering reason and internal harmony. Aristotle reverses this formula, saying that virtue is established through habits. However, according to Kant, just and rational people following these examples would not be acting morally if their actions were self-interested in the slightest. My question, then, is this: should one bother to try to live up to Kant's standard of morality?
I do not see the practical application of Kant's definition of morality. I can turn to Plato or Aristotle for methods of achieving virtuous behavior. Why should anyone care if these actions do not live up to Kant's definition of morality? What does one gain by adopting Kant's view that actions cannot be moral unless they proceed from a sense of duty alone?
I want to discuss the same quote that Esha used in her blog post. Kant writes that "there are many souls so sympathetically attuned that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But I assert that in such a case an action of this kind, however it may conform with duty and however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the same footing with other inclinations" (4:398).
I find this passage troubling. Think of Plato's Republic for the sake of comparison. Plato says that the individual who maintains an internal balance with reason as the ruler will inevitably do virtuous acts. This seems like a defensible position, and it has useful practical application—I can try to become a just person by fostering reason and internal harmony. Aristotle reverses this formula, saying that virtue is established through habits. However, according to Kant, just and rational people following these examples would not be acting morally if their actions were self-interested in the slightest. My question, then, is this: should one bother to try to live up to Kant's standard of morality?
I do not see the practical application of Kant's definition of morality. I can turn to Plato or Aristotle for methods of achieving virtuous behavior. Why should anyone care if these actions do not live up to Kant's definition of morality? What does one gain by adopting Kant's view that actions cannot be moral unless they proceed from a sense of duty alone?
I think we can agree that Kant's definition of moral worth is an incredibly demanding one, probably impossible to completely fulfill through one's actions. However, I see value not just in the achievement of virtue, as is theoretically possible in Aristotle and Plato's philosophies, but also in the strenuous and never-ending quest for virtue proposed by Kant. If you accept that an action with good motives is inherently more admirable than the same action with impure and selfish motives, then even the attempt to transition to more selfless, duty based motives and away from selfish motives has value. Viewing the quest for virtue as a constant journey that can never quite be achieved could be seen as discouraging and degrading, but it also helps avoid a sort of moral stagnancy that could appear in a system that views moral good as an attainable destination. Instead of one day "reaching virtue," and no longer needing "improvement," you are constantly striving to be better, closer to the ideal.
ReplyDeleteI agree with you Mills. Through what we've read so far of the ancient philosophers, their points seem aimed at more of a practical way to proper ethics and virtue, in a sense that is always attainable or at least possible to get closer to. Kant, however, seems to say that if you do moral or virtuous actions because it benefits you, that it is not moral. Is it not the case that most moral actions, regardless of self-interest, do end up benefiting the self, either physically or mentally? It seems that the whole is self-interested, in that you do the what you believe is virtuous not just because it helps others, but makes you a better person. It seems that Kant says if self-interest is at all a point in ones motives to act morality, there is no real morality present, but the feeling of self-interest and fulfillment while acting morally I think is impossible to separate from the act itself.
ReplyDeleteMills,
ReplyDeleteThis is an aspect of Kant's philosophy that I struggle with as well. It helps me to keep two things in mind when I am considering the *Groundwork*.
First, It is not the case that Kant is saying that an action cannot be moral if we enjoy doing it. Rather, he is saying that an action is not moral if our reason for doing it is to feel good or to satisfy any other desire (as opposed to adhering to duty). We can enjoy doing an action, and have it be moral, as long as we are acting out of duty and not self interest. As a matter of fact, I think that our common sense understanding of virtue agrees with Kant here more than it would a consequentialist understanding of virtue (which is the form taken by the argument that self-interested actions can be moral). For example, consider a situation in which a person distributes meals to the homeless because it is a paying job and she needs the money, and so she performs this job without "good will." Now, a consequentialist would say that this is an inherently moral action, but Kant would not. I think that most of us would be inclined to side with Kant more than the consequentialist.
Second, It is also important to note that Kant is not saying that an action that has good consequences but is performed for the sake of feeling good is IMMORAL but rather that it is AMORAL. This is a small difference in terms but a large difference in meaning.
Thanks for the feedback, everyone. I have found Kant to be the most challenging philosopher to understand so far (but, as a Greek and Roman Studies major, I tend to favor the ancient philosophers).
ReplyDelete