Friday, September 9, 2011

Perfect in Theory?

In our discussions of Plato's Republic, most students seemed to agree that the leadership of Plato's imaginary polis would be perfect in theory, but apparently no one accepted that this city—"Kallipolis"—would function perfectly in the real world.  In this post I will argue that the system of rulers in Kallipolis is not perfect in theory, and I'll analyze the real world application problem by comparing Plato's system with Athenian-style direct democracy.

Plato argues that the wise are naturally suited to be rulers.  Their wisdom allows them to make the best decisions, and this will lead to the greatest good for their state.  But is this, even in theory, a just society?  Plato has concentrated all governing power in the hands of the smallest class of his city.  The producers, the largest class, are denied any say in the governing of their city.  To me this seems unjust.  Even if one accepts that the philosopher-kings will remain benevolent and act in the best interest of the entire city, Plato's system bans any political input from the majority of citizens.  The non-ruling majority in Kallipolis has no ability to affect the structure of the society they live in.  Even if they love their rulers and benefit tremendously from being ruled, they possess no potential to change their society; the rulers force them to comply.  Whether or not the rulers make just individual decisions, I believe that Kallipolis is not a just state because the citizens have no freedom to disagree with the rulers or to exert their own power.

In practice, Plato's system breaks down even further.  It is not reasonable to expect that a few rulers, even wise rulers, could assemble enough information to always act in the best interests of their city.  In fact, the philosopher-kings probably could not fare better than the producers at making decisions for their state.

Imagine an ancient city that economically flourishes through the production and trade of pottery.  How would the philosopher-kings be more qualified to regulate the pottery trade in the city than the producers who are intimately familiar with the industry?  Plato might respond that the masses of producers could not effectively regulate themselves because they have competing interests.  This is a legitimate concern, but we should not assume that a few wise rulers could amass enough information to make better decisions than the producers.  In a society like democratic Athens (direct democracy, rather than modern representative democracy), the competing interests would be resolved by the vote of the majority.  Certainly the majority could make poor decisions, but democratic deliberation would allow for the aggregation of the knowledge of every citizen, including people directly involved with key sectors of the state (Athens limited citizenship to free adult Athenian males.  Without a doubt this is a significant failing, but, since slavery and misogyny were ubiquitous in the ancient world, it is not a strong criticism of the idea of democracy).  It is unreasonable to expect that a small collection of rulers like Plato's philosopher-kings could replicate democracy's level of collective knowledge.

Without even considering that the rulers might be self-interested rather than rule for the common good, the logistical problem of a few people making decisions with absolutely no input from the majority means that Plato's system of government could not justly keep a state in order.  However, even if we consider Kallipolis only in theory and assume that its rulers would possess enough knowledge to always make good decisions, the society still lacks justice.  The majority of citizens have no political share in their society, and they lack the freedom and potential to change their city.

9 comments:

  1. I have the same reservations about Plato's theory. It relies on a number of assumptions that don't seem to translate in reality. (And personally his theory of forms, although intriguing, isn't exactly convincing either)

    Secondly, in every defense of Plato's theory I always hear people making unwarranted assumptions or bringing the argument back to the theoretical argument. They avoid important questions about its utility *in reality*. (it's kind of frustrating really). That's certainly not a sound way to form a social structure.

    Lastly, I agree with you that, at the symposium, it will be a tall order for Plato representatives to defend slavery and misogyny. It should be fun though...

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  2. Thomas,

    Thanks for the comment. My slavery and misogyny comment was actually about Athens, which I compared with Plato's Kallipolis. Plato seems to call for a higher social status for women (discussed in Book 5, 454-456 of the Republic, but I don't think this was included in our selections for class). But, again, it is hard to imagine that this would be realized in practice. The philosopher-kings could enact laws attempting to extend more freedom and opportunities to women, but the challenge of overcoming widespread prejudice would remain.

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  3. You have me convinced that Plato's Kallipolis is essentially destined for failure in practice due to the impossibility of a perfectly wise and benevolent ruler among other weaknesses you've discussed in class and on the blog, and I agree that in reality (which is ultimately all that really counts), a larger democratically run group is more likely to result in just decisions than a small group of elite "wise" men. However, purely in theory, I don't quite see the inherent injustice of a small group of rulers that you discuss. If these rulers were truly wise and benevolent, the decisions they made would create just conditions for all and eliminate the need and desire for the majority to change their city. The ability to enjoy such ideal conditions shouldn't be dependent on the ability to exercise immediate democratic control over them.

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  4. Mills,

    I don't think anyone will disagree with you on the non-practicality of Plato's theory. As I was reading the exert off the Republic, I could imagine him living in his own little world in his head, not really taking into accounts real world conditions (which is something that Aristotle does, and why i find him more digestable). So yeah, his theory is not "practical", but i don't see how you proved that it wasn't "perfect".

    Your post was very interesting, and it demonstrated a lot of what we all do when we are 'uncomfortable' with an idea, a theory. We begin to change the conditions, or add new ones and delete others. in short, we tend to apply this theory to real life, instead of looking at it just as it is.

    Plato's THEORY just as it is, IS perfect. (which in my opinion is why it is only a theory and not a reality). Now to demonstrate what I am trying to say, let me respond to one of the points you proposed in your post.

    "... the rulers force them to comply." In Plato's theory, no one forces anyone to comply. They all somehow as "healthy" beings and citizens "reasonably understand" that, that's what they must each do. Again in reality, this makes no sense, but in theory it is .... perfect.

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  5. Stephanie and Nellie,

    Thanks for the comments. I see you both disagree with the claim in my second paragraph that Plato's city is not perfect in theory. You both raised good objections to my argument, but let me refine my point a bit further. I think that, in theory, the philosopher-kings would create a fair society, but I would not call it just.

    As Nellie points out, the rulers don't force anyone to comply in the sense that they subject citizens to the system against their will. However, I still see Kallipolis as a different sort of forced compliance, because the producers lack the potential to enact change. Even if they would never dream of wanting a different form of government, I see this lack of potential as a violation of their freedom.

    Imbedded in my post was an idea I probably should have made more explicit: I think that a state must do more than make a series of fair individual decisions to be called just. Justice (Plato would agree here) is a healthy internal condition as well as the actions that proceed from that condition. I feel that this includes extending basic rights to the citizens. A society that deprives its citizens of the freedom to voice any desire for change lacks a prerequisite for justice.

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  6. Mills,

    First of all, this is a phenomenal post. You're example of the pottery trade is unique and brings up what I see to be the largest problem in the Kallipolis: namely, the isolation of experience that is inherent to the caste system. By this I mean, as you point out, that the rulers may have all the reason in the world, but they still do not *know* what it is like to be a potter. It takes experiential knowledge of a trade in order to understand what is best for it. That is why we like our secretary of education to have been a teacher and our attorney general to have been a lawyer, and so on.

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  7. Mills, though I too tend to think very critically of any assumptions made by a philosopher, I believe you are continuously putting a democratic spin on your view of these ideas. You are yourself assuming that “basic rights” means the ability to determine one’s own path in making one’s own decisions. However, we tend to define it that way only because democracy is based on individual determinism.

    In regard to the statement, “Even if they would never dream of wanting a different form of government, I see this lack of potential as a violation of their freedom,” I can’t help but notice a flaw in the reasoning. This is like the USA government banning people from growing wings and flying like birds. What I mean is that a limitation (such as who can and cannot participate in governing) cannot actually be an infringement on freedom if the act it is limiting is impossible anyway (in the theory, since the society is PERFECT, a person born to be a shoemaker WILL be a shoemaker and will not WANT to be a ruler). So the inability of such workers to rule is not actually a ban on freedom—it’s what actually makes the society “perfect” in this particular sense.

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  8. Karissa,

    How your words warm my heart. You were able to put in words an idea that i was obviously straining to explain.

    Again Mills, i don't think any of us will argue with the statement that the worls Plato has created will fall head first if it was implemented in our society. However, in order to fully understand what Plato is saying we need to stop trying so much to implement it in our society, and look at the conditions under which Plato stated his point.

    Because the conditions on top of which he created his theory were 'perfect,' meaning each citizens would have a "healthy soul" and would understand his/her position, the result is a "pefect" society.
    Following the train of thoughts in your arguments up above, the biggest reason you find this theory imperfect is because you find the condition imperfect: Citizens are depreived of their freedoms, they are being forced in this system, "The producers, the largest class, are denied any say in the governing of their city" ... All of these are arguments against the 'conditions' Plato has set in place for his theory. An though it is completely understandable why we might do it, we cannot just change the conditions in place and call his theory imperfect.

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  9. Colin,

    Thanks for the compliments! I'm glad that we agree.


    Karissa and Nellie,

    I count a total of three criticisms in your posts. Let me outline them and try to respond to each as I go along.

    1) My criticism of Plato is shaped by my life in a democratic context. My association of justice with a wider base of individual political freedom—a product of my democratic context—is flawed.

    response: Whether or not I am biased in favor of democracy, this does not address the relative justice of differing systems of government. The question remains: is a society just that denies the majority of its citizens any political voice? I have claimed here that a just society does more than make a series a fair decisions. It also maintains just internal conditions. This, I feel, includes offering citizens at least some potential to act in their own interest by attempting to change the conditions of the society they live in. Remember that Plato does not only call for some people to rule and some people to be ruled. He feels that any input whatsoever from the majority is a breach of justice, describing it as "meddling" and as "rebellion" (Republic 444b). He even says that "the rebellious part is by nature suited to be a slave." And, indeed, the situation of the producers seems to be essentially slavery, albeit with benevolent masters. If we feel that slavery is unjust because it denies freedom to the individual, how can we say that Plato's system, which denies freedom to most individuals, is perfectly just in theory?

    2) Plato's producers do not want to rule, so it does not matter that they have no voice in government.

    response: As above, the comparison with slavery helps to refute this objection, because this same reasoning could be used to justify slavery. We can imagine a theoretical slave who loves his master, is treated exceptionally well, and would in his entire life never desire freedom. But I don't think any of us would consider this particularly benevolent master-slave relationship to be a just arrangement, even in theory. In both this scenario and in Plato's theory, I feel it is irrelevant whether or not the slave or producer desires freedom. The denial of freedom itself is unjust. Even if the philosopher-kings always make the most fair decision for everyone, they have not overcome this unjust internal condition in their state.

    3) My criticism of Plato's system is directed at the preconditions for his theory rather than the theory itself.

    response: Above I talk about the internal conditions of Kallipolis. However, I disagree that I'm criticizing preconditions for Plato's theory by talking about the Republic's ruler-ruled relationship. I think of things like the claim that "everyone has an ergon" as Plato's preconditions. However, this is beside the point.

    Even if I am attacking a condition, I am not changing the conditions by criticizing them. An imperfection in the preconditions of the theory seems just as relevant as problems with the theory itself, since it will lead to imperfect results in the theory one constructs out of those conditions.


    Thank you for the feedback, everyone! This has been a fun discussion.

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