The notion of infinite responsibility intrigues me. On one hand, I find the arguments for it convincing. As we’ve discussed in class, and as Sartre illustrates in Existentialism is a Humanism, we have responsibility for the way the world is, and all that that includes. This is not to say that each of us is the direct cause for the total state of affairs that exists in the world, but rather that because we are freedoms we find ourselves constantly having to make response choices. To use Sartre’s example, when a war is fought somewhere in the world we must choose how we respond to it. We can choose to endorse it, condemn it, or attempt to ignore it, but we have made a response (in the sense of response-ability) and are now ethically connected to the war. If the war persists and we support it or ignore it, then we share in the responsibility for the war’s continuance; the war becomes “our war” whether we want it to or not.
On the other hand, however, there certainly is a sense in which the principle of infinite responsibility is asking too much of individual human beings. It is a facticity of human existence that we simply cannot direct our attention or our responses in infinite directions. John Stewart Mill addresses this in Utilitarianism. The detractors of Utilitarianism criticize it for asking too much or human beings in the way that we have described, but Mill gets around this question by arguing that most of the time the decisions we make only affect a small group of people close to us. At the time, I found this argument convincing, but now I am no longer sure. I’m caught between what I find to be plausibility of the principle of infinite responsibility and the certainty that I simply cannot respond to everything.
So what am I to make of this? I think that existentialism is a philosophy that is supposed to make one feel uneasy, to feel that one cannot address all of one’s responsibilities. Perhaps, then, the principle of infinite responsibility does not demand that I respond infinitely, but that I recognize that every choice I make bears a burden of responsibility with it. As Thomas has discussed in his post, this is not a positive ethical theory, but I think that when combined with a positive morality existentialism leads one to be highly ethical.
Colin,
ReplyDeleteI liked this post. Sartre's war example, which you mentioned, actually made me more skeptical of his notion of radical human freedom. I thought of the conflicts that broke out in the Arab Spring movement, and specifically the loyalist soldiers who have opposed popular revolutions to defend oppressive regimes. There is a lot more at stake with these people's choices to fight than with our choices of what position to take on the conflict. Yet it seems like they would have far less freedom in making their choice. Many of them, having grown up in a societies based on cults of personality, must have basically been brainwashed to fight for the regime. They may have been lied to and thought they were actually doing a great moral good in defending the regime. Others perhaps were coerced into fighting. So, it seems to me that, although these people still have freedom to a degree, they certainly have significantly diminished freedom.
So, to tie this back in with your post: do you agree with my claim that there are degrees of freedom — that some people are less free than others? If so, would that affect your assessment about infinite responsibility?
Thanks for the response Mills.
ReplyDeleteTo be completely honest with you, I'm not even sure that free will exists. My largest scruple with existentialism is that is assumes human freedom without giving a convincing metaphysical basis for freedom.
To answer your question, however, I do agree, and I think that Sartre would too, that there are degrees of freedom. I believe that Sartre would call this a person's "situation."